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RECENT DECISIONS

FUTURE INTERESTS - TAXATION - EVIDENCE - PRESUMPTION AS TO
THE PossIBILITY OF A WOMAN BEARING CHILDREN -Testatrix, a resident
of Massachusetts, set up a trust of her residuary estate for her two daughters,
the principal to be paid to their issue, but if either should die without issue, her
share to be paid to certain named charities. On probate, the remainder to charity
was held to be void. The income tax law of Massachusetts imposed a three per
cent levy on income accumulated for contingent future interests, but exempted
from taxation certain interests of nonresidents, including vested remainders not
subject to being divested. The daughters, nonresidents, contended that their
interests should not be taxed as contingent and introduced evidence before the
appellate tax board to show that they were unmarried and had never borne issue,
that one of them was sixty-two years of age, that the other was fifty-two years
old and had undergone a surgical operation which made it impossible for her to
bear children. Held, for the purpose of the income tax statute, it is permissible
to introduce medical evidence to rebut the presumption that a woman is always
capable of bearing issue. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation 'ii. Bullard,
(Mass. 1943) 46 N.E. (2d) 557.
Doubtless the observation of Lord Coke that "the law seeth no impossibility
of having children" 1 expressed the viewpoint at early common law with respect
to the capacity of a female to bear children. 2 It has been suggested that this
presumption was adopted because of the uncertainty stemming from the imperfect medical knowledge of the times and because of the many not-too-well
authenticated stories of births at very advanced ages which were then current.8
Today the cases presenting the problem of continuing capacity of a woman to
bear children usually fall into one of five major groups: (1) those dealing with
the application of the rule agaipst perpetuities, ( 2) those involving the distribution of property, (3) those where termination of a trust is sought, (4) those
involving the marketability of titles to land, and (5) those dealing with the
taxation of contingent future interests. For the purpose of the rule against
perpetuities,4 the courts both in England and the United States seem to regard
1

Co. Litt. 28 a.
The presumption of the possibility of issue in men has never been held to be
rebutted. See note to Apgar's Case, 37 N.J. Eq. 501 (1883).
8
United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 at 283, 54 S. Ct. 389
(1934). Coke tells of a woman in his time who bore a child at the age of 70 and
refers to the fact that "as women in ancient times have had children at that age,
whereunto no woman doth now attain, the law cannot adjudge that impossible which
by nature was possible." Co. Litt. 40 a. The Biblical story of the birth of Isaac to
Sarah at the age of 90 is also occasionally referred to as proof of the capacity of very
aged women to bear issue. See Re Dougan, 139 Ga. 351, 77 S.E. 158 (1913).
4 Lovering v. Lovering, l 29 Mass. 97 ( 18 80) [ the authority of this case is somewhat weakened by the fact, disclosed in Dorr v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530 at 532, 18
N.E. 412 (1888), that counsel conceded that the gift was too remote if afterborn
children were included in the limitation over]; Blackhurst v. Johnson, (C.C.A. 8th,
1934) 72 F. (2d) 644; Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228
N.W. 703 (1930), woman 52 years old; Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134
N.E. 276 (1922), age not given; Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489
(1922), age 50; Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787), woman 70
years old; Re Dawson, 39 Ch. Div. 155 (1888), age 60; Griffiths v. Deloitte, [1926]
2
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as conclusive the presumption that the possibility of issue continues until death.
In cases where an estate or fund is to be distributed, depending upon whether
the possibility of issue is extinct, the rule is not so well settled, the English courts
and some 0£ the American courts permitting evidence of the improbability of
issue to be introduced for the purpose of rebutting the presumption. 5 In cases
involving the termination of trusts and the marketability of titles, the courts are
again divided, with perhaps a slightly greater commitment in favor of the conclusiveness of the presumption where specific performance is asked 6 than where
termination of a trust is sought. 7 The last group of cases, those involving taxaCh. 56 (65 years of age); annotations 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 865 (1914); 67 A.L.R. 538
(1930); 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 497 (1936). Contra: Cooper v. La Roche,
17 Ch. Div. 368 (1881). This case has never been followed either in England or
America and is severely criticized by GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed.,
§ 215a (1915). And see discussion of the case in Re Dawson, 39 Ch. Div. 155 at
163 (1888), to the e.ffect that Vice Chancellor Malins was taken by surprise.
5
The English cases are represented by Reynolds v. Reynolds, I Di-ck. 374, 21
Eng. Rep. 314 (1764), woman 62 years old; Hamilton v. Brickwood, 5 L.J.(Ch.)
(N.S.) 144 (1836), 65 years old; Lyddon v. Ellison, 19 Beav. 565, 52 Eng. Rep. 470
(1854), 56 years old; Maden v. Taylor, 45 L.J. (Ch.) (N.S.) 569 (1876), 60 years
of age; Re Lowman, [1895] 2 Ch. 348 (70 years old); Re Belt, 37 L.T.N.S. 272
(1877), 52 years old and medical evidence that she could not bear children. The
English courts have sometimes demanded that security be given to guard against subsequent births-Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra; Leng v. Hodges, Jacob 585, 37 Eng.
Rep. 971 (1822)-but the practice has been discontinued, probably because there
was no record of issue born after the distribution in previous cases. Re Dawson, 39
Ch. Div. 155 (1888). Following the English view are Male v. Williams, 48 N.J. Eq.
33, 21 A. 854 (1891), woman 68 years old; Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280
S.W. 1012 (1925), bond demanded of two unmarried sisters 58 and 64 years old
respectively; Johnson v. Beauchamp, 5 Dana (35 Ky.) 70 (1837), woman 47 years
old; Gowen's Appeal, 106 Pa. 288 (1884), woman 56 years old, but here there was a
statute providing for the distribution of personalty on security being given. Representative of the American cases refusing evidence to rebut the presumption are Riley v.
Riley, 92 N.J. Eq. 465, II3 A. 777 (1921), 40 years old; Hill v. Sangamon Loan &
Trust Co., 295 Ill. 619, 129 N.E. 554 (1920), age 63; Hill v. Spencer, 196 Ill. 65,
63 N.E. 614 (1902), averment that the woman was beyond the age of child bearing;
Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E. 62 (1921), age 69; Towle v. Delano,
144 Mass. 95, IO N.E. 769 (1887), ages 51 and 53. And see annotations 48 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 865 at 868 (1914); 67 A.L.R. 538 at 541 (1930); also 3 SIMES, FUTURE·
INTERESTS,§ 747 (1936).
6
Azarch v. Smith, 222 Ky. 566, I S.W. (2d) 968 (1928), age 50; Aulick v.
Summers, 186 Ky. 810, 217 S.W. 1024 (1920), age 63; Williams v. J.C. Armiger
& Bro., 129 Md. 222, 98 A. 542 (1916), 68 years old; Westhafer v. Koons, 144 Pa.
26, 22 A. 885 (1891), 56 years old; List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1877), age 75.
Holding that the presumption is not conclusive are: Bacot v. Fessenden, l 30 App. Div.
819, II5 N.Y.S. 698 (1909) age 59; Whitney v. Groo, 4o·App. D.C. 496 (1913),
70 years old; Landers v. People's Building & Loan Assn., 190 Ark. 1072, 81 S.W.
(2d) 917 (1935), agreement of counsel that the woman was past the age of childbearing.
7
Refusing termination are Byers v. Beddow, 106 Fla. 166, 142 So. 894 (1932),
medical testimony that the woman could not bear children; May v. Bank of Hardinsburg & Trust Co., 150 Ky. 136, 150 S.W. 12 (1912), age 75; Brown v. Owsley, 198
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tion, is as yet rather small, but, with one exception,8 the introduction of evidence
to show that the possibility of issue is extinct has been permitted.9 The courts
seem to have felt that taxation is an eminently practical matter and that an
interest should not be taxed as contingent if there is actual evidence that it cannot be divested.10 There has as yet been no tendency to extend the liberal
principles of the tax cases to a general principle covering all litigation,11 but it
would seem that the reasons 12 for refusing such evidence in cases other than
those involving the devolution of a title 13 are not too well founded. In the
Ky. 344, 248 S.W. 889 (1923), 60 years old; Re Richards Trust Estate, 97 Md.
608, 55 A. 384 (1903), age 53. See 3 Sco'IT, TRUSTS,§ 340.1 (1939).
Permitting termination where no objection is raised to the evidence are Magrath
v. Magrath, 184 S.C. 243, 192 S.E. 273 (1937), 60 years old; Whitney v. Groo,
40 App. D.C. 496 (1913), 70 years old; and cases cited in 3 Sco'IT, TRUSTS, § 340.1,
note 4 ( 193 9). The English courts are again more liberal in admitting such evidence.
See cases cited in 67 A.L.R. 538 at 549 (1930).
8
Farrington v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 1st, 1929) 30 F.
(2d) 915, cert. denied 279 U.S. 873, 49 S. Ct. 513 (1929). The authority of this
case is considerably weakened, if not obliterated, by the fact that it was decided prior
to United States v. Provident Trust Co., post, note 9.
9
United qtates v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272, 54 S. Ct. 389 (1934),
age 63 and surgical operation; City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United States, (C.C.A.
2d, 1935) 74 F. (2d) 692, 59 years old. Cf. Humes v. United States, 276 U.S.
487, 49 S. Ct. 347 (1927). See note in 43 YALE L. J. 1193 (1934).
10
"Tax laws are to be construed as imposing taxes with respect to matters of
substance and not with respect to mere matters of form." Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation v. Second National Bank of Boston, 308 Mass. 1 at 6, 30 N.E.
(2d) 889 (1941). It would seem that more weight is given to evidence of a surgical
operation which makes birth of issue impossible than to advanced age or infirmity. 'The
important point to be emphasized is that the question arises with respect to a surgical
operation, the inevitably destructive effect of which upon the power of procreation is
established by tangible and irrefutable proof." United States v. Provident Trust Co.,
291 U.S. 272 at 285, 54 S. Ct. 389 (1934).
11
The American Law Institute has taken the position that, in the cases discussed
herein, other than those involving the rule against perpetuities, the presumption can
be rebutted "by relevant evidence as to such person and by past experience concerning
births to persons of like age and physical condition." 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§ 274 (1940).
12
Apart from the argument that one can never be certain as to the possibility of
having issue, the reasons given for this view are that admission of such evidence is an
unwarranted and immodest inquiry into intimate and personal affairs and that to permit
proof of incapacity will stimulate surgical operations to create impotence. In reply, it
is said that matters of equal indelicacy are commonly proved in court and that the risk
of women submitting themselves to such operations simply to evade a tax law is indeed
slight. The court in the principal case went further and said that liability to taxation
was based on the fact of capacity and that such operations would not constitute an
evasion of tax law. 46 N.E. (2d) at 570. Another reason sometimes given for refusing admission of evidence of incapacity is that such a policy makes for uncertainty
in the law and thereby increases litigation.
18
It is suggested that a line should be drawn refusing such evidence only where
the devolution of a title is involved, that there the question should be the possibility
rather than the probability of issue. 3 SrMEs, FuTURE INTERESTS, § 747 (1936). In
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absence of important policy considerations,14 there would se·em to be little justification for an unqualified refusal to take cognizance of the facts which have been
exposed since Coke's day by an advance in medical knowledge and an increase
in statistical data. 15

Hobart Taylor, Jr.

answer, it may be argued that it is quite as feasible to give after-born children their
share in these cases as in other instances; e.g., where specific performance is decreed
on the assumption that the title is marketable.
14 In United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 at 285, 54 S. Ct. 389
( 1934), the court clearly stated that there exists no policy which called for the strict
application of the presumption to a particular physical condition.
15 Statistics compiled by the United States Department of Commerce and referred
to in City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 74 F. (2d)
692 at 693,694 show that of 20,389,873 births between 1923 and 1932, not one was
to a woman 55 years old or over and that the chance of a woman between 50 and 54
years of age bearing children is .ooo 1.
The principal case has also been noted in 43 CoL. L. REV. 407 (1943). For
other law review discussion of the problem, see 18 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. H)9 (1938);
49 JuRm. REv. 75 (1937); 186 L. T. 3II (1938); 2 Mo. L. REv. 100 (1937); II
TEMP. L. Q. 259 (1937); 23 VA. L. REV. 214 (1936); 43 YALE L. J. Il93 (1934).

